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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine yourself charged with a capital crime, on trial for your life. You have 
been convicted and the jury is now hearing evidence in the penalty phase to 
determine your fate. You are relying on your counsel, the judge, even the 
prosecutor, to assure you a fair trial. Now imagine that no one in the courtroom 
knows all of the correct sentencing options. Although the law allows the jury 
to sentence you to death or to one of several life terms, including life 
imprisonment without parole, no one knows that life without parole 
(hereinafter LWOP) is an option. 
Although this scenario seems implausible, this is just the circumstance 
Charles Marshall faced in a Cleveland courtroom in the fall of 1997.2 When this 
fateful error was uncovered, the trial judge ordered an untested cure for this 
mistake: Charles Marshall would receive a new penalty phase trial before a 
new jury.3 A brand new amendment to Ohio Revised Code 2929.06,4 now 
allowed a different jury, a jury that had not convicted the defendant, to sentence 
the defendant to death. Thus, State v. Marshall was to become the test case for 
a new statute.S 
2State v. Marshall, No. CR 349190 (Ohio C.P. 1997). 
3Qrder of October 14, 1997, Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Case No. CR 
349190. 
4See OHIO REv. ANN.§ 2929.06 (Anderson 1997) (enacted as Senate Bill258, effective 
October 16, 1996). A different resentencing approach appeared in Ohio's initial capital 
punishment statutory scheme, effective October 1981. Id. 
5Ultimately Charles Marshall's case would not be the vehicle for testing this new 
provision. The original trial judge recused himself and the replacement judge granted 
a defense motion for an entirely new trial of guilt/innocence. Order of December 12, 
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This article explores and analyzes the two-pronged legal dilemma that 
confronted the Marshall court: in Ohio, finding the correct sentencing law is 
often difficult; and a recent amendment to the resentencing portion of that law, 
S.B. 258, destroys the efficiency that was characteristic of Ohio's previous 
resentencing framework. Consequently, Part II of this article examines the facts 
and holding of State v. Marshall and suggests that finding the applicable law 
must be simplified. Practitioner handbooks are often confusing and 
incomplete, in part as the Ohio legislature generates an ever-changing body of 
law. Justice and the lives of human beings demand remedial steps to avert this 
problem. Part III describes the evolution of Ohio's resentencing law and the 
recent adoption of Senate Bill 258, amending Ohio Revised Code section 
2929.06. Following a brief description of Ohio's bifurcated6 capital litigation 
scheme, Part IV asserts that jury penalty retrials pursuant to Senate Bill258 will 
lead to more challenges in the courts, may well waste limited judicial and 
criminal justice system resources, may prove unworkable in practice, and are 
not likely to serve the interests of justice. And after concluding with the 
assertion that Senate Bi11258 is unwise, unworkable, and better left alone, Part 
V highlights the quite illusory benefits of re-seeking death, while noting that 
vengeful actions often work against healing. 
II. STATE v. MARSHALL: FINDING THE APPLICABLE LAW IS DIFFICULT 
A. Facts and Holding 
The robbery and slaying of pizza shop owner Rocco Buccieri on December 
22, 1996 prompted the prosecution of Charles Marshall for aggravated murder 
with aggravating circumstances, a crime punishable by death in Ohio? On 
September 19, 1997, the jury found Marshall guilty of aggravated murder with 
1997, State v. Marshall, No. CR 349190 (Ohio C.P. 1997). The State appealed, but the 
appeal was dismissed. As of this writing, no trial date has been set. 
6The United States Supreme Court requires that capital trials have two phases: the 
trial phase, where guilt or innocence is determined; and the penalty phase, where the 
sentence is determined (if one has been convicted of a capital crime). See e.g., Sumner v. 
Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987) (noting that bifurcating a trial into a guilt-determination 
phase and a penalty phase tends to prevent the concerns relevant at one phase from 
infecting jury deliberations during the other). 
7Charles Marshall was indicted March 31, 1997. State v. Marshall, No. CR 349190 
(Ohio C.P. 1997). See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01(8) (Anderson 1997)(effective 
1981)(defining, in pertinent part, aggravated murder as "purposely causing the death 
of another while committing or attempting to commit ... aggravated robbery"). Section 
2929.04(A) sets forth the statutory aggravating circumstances, one of which must be 
proven to make the death penalty an eligible sentencing option. See also§§ 2941.14(8) 
and 2929.03. The aggravating circumstance charged here was "the offense was 
committed while the offender was committing ... aggravated robbery ... , and either the 
offender was the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder or, if 
not the principal offender, committed the aggravated murder with prior calculation and 
design." Section 2929.04(A)(7). 
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aggravating circumstances. His case then proceeded to a penalty phase before 
the same jury pursuant to section 2929.03 of the Ohio Revised Code.B At the 
penalty phase, the trial judge instructed the jury that their sentencing options 
were life imprisonment with two different parole eligibility options or death.9 
On October 9, 1997, the jury returned a death sentence recommendation.lO The 
following day, the trial judge sentenced Charles Marshall to death.ll 
On October 11, 1997, it was discovered through an unusual chain of events 
that the judge had grievously erred in instructing the jury regarding the 
sentencing options.12 In fact, everyone-the prosecutors, defense counsel, and 
8Thepenaltyphase began on October6, 1997. State v. Marshall, No. CR349190 (Ohio 
C.P. 1997). Ohio law provides for a penalty trial before the trial jury and the trial judge, 
or before the three-judge panel that tried the defendant pursuant to a jury waiver. See 
OHro REv. CoDE ANN. § 2929.03(C)(2)(b) (Anderson 1997). See also section 
2929.03(D)(directing the jury or panel of judges to weigh aggravating circumstances 
against mitigating factors). 
9 See Marshall, No. CR 349190. The judge outlined Marshall's imprisonment options 
as: (1) life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after serving twenty full years; 
or (2) life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years. 
lOOmo REv. CoDE ANN.§ 2929.03 (D)(2), (3) (Anderson 1997). Ohio trial juries may 
recommend the death sentence, but this is not binding. I d. The judge makes the ultimate 
determination of whether death will be imposed after an independent weighing of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. I d. However, if the jury recommends one of 
the life terms (or is unable to unanimously recommend a death sentence), the jury's life 
recommendation is binding on the trial judge. Id. Ohio Revised Code § 2929.03(D)(3) 
requires an independent assessment of the evidence by the trial judge, before death can 
be imposed. Id. "If the court finds, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt ... that the 
aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing outweigh the 
mitigating factors, it shall impose sentence of death on the offender ... absent such a 
finding by the court, the court shall impose one of the [life sentences]." Id.; see also § 
2929.03(F) (requiring the trial court prepare a separate opinion identifying the reasons 
for the decision); but see State v. Fox, 631 N.E.2d 124 (1994) (finding trial court's failure 
to specify reasons is not reversible error as this can be cured by the appellate court's 
own independent review). 
11 Marshall, No. CR 349190. News reports relate that the trial judge had "already told 
jurors that he [would] impose their finding, whatever it might be." James Ewinger, Pizza 
Shop Murder Jury Seeks Death Sentence, THE PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 10, 1997 at 1-B, available 
in 1997 WL 6618003. This is troubling, as the trial judge is supposed to make an 
independent determination. See§ 2929.03(D)(3). Yet, this is not unusual. Ohio trial 
judgeshaveover-ridden jury death sentence recommendations only four times. See State 
v. Drewey Kiser, No. 82-CR-69 (Ross C.P. 1983); State v. Alonzo Wright, No. CR-211379 
(Cuyahoga C.P. 1987); State v. Eddie Robertson, No. 88-CR-3179 (Montgomery Ct. C. 
Pl. 1989); State v. John Parsons, No. 88-CR-279 (Franklin Ct. C. Pl. 1990). 
12James Ewinger & James F. McCarty, Judge Erred in Directions to Pizza-Shop Killing 
Jury, PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 11, 1997, at 1-A,availab/e in 1997WL 6618206. The judge's error 
in instructing the jury was inadvertently discovered when a juror read the morning 
paper and found that the judge's jury instructions were not accurately reported. Id. The 
article indicated that the jury had been given the option of sentencing Marshall to life 
without parole. Id. However, the judge never gave that instruction. Id. As the reporter 
was not in court when the instructions were issued, he merely assumed, based on his 
knowledge of the applicable law, that the judge presented life without parole as an 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol46/iss2/5
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the judge-failed to discover the correct penalties available to the jury.13 
Although LWOP was a sentencing option which could have conceivably 
spared the life of Charles Marshall, no one knew it. 
How could such a fundamental mistake occur? Didn't anyone bother to look 
up the law? The answer to the latter question it appears is, yes.14 Everyone 
thought that the effective date of the LWOP amendment to section 2929.03 was 
January 1, 1997.15 Thus no one thought LWOP was a required option.16 
B. Handbooks: Handy, but Often Dangerously Incomplete 
State v. Marshall illustrates a current problem in administering justice in Ohio: 
determining the applicable law is often times difficult and confusing. The Ohio 
legislature has been churning out legislation in the criminal arena at what 
seems an unprecedented rate. Very few lawyers or judges study the actual bills 
which produce a given law. Most litigants tend to rely on standard reference 
manuals to conduct day-to-day litigation. Publications such as The Ohio 
Criminal Lnw Handbook purportedly provide all the relevant statutes and rules 
in one convenient volume.l7 Litigators use these handbooks to find the 
applicable law. However, these publications offer limited guidance, because 
they generally fail to explain how a law was changed by a referenced bill. 
Consequently, the applicable law often remains a mystery. 
The participants in State v. Marshall properly looked to section 2929.03 of the 
Ohio Revised Code to find the appropriate sentencing options, but they 
erroneously determined that those options were not available alternatives to 
the death sentence in this case.lS In perusing the legislative history contained 
available sentencing option. Id. When the juror called the reporter to tell him that the 
article was in error, the reporter checked his own references, and determined that life 
without parole was indeed an eligible punishment. Id. The reporter then contacted the 
trial judge. Id. 
l3Jd. 
14The trial judge relied on The Ohio Criminal Law Handbook. THE OHIO CRIMINAL LAW 
HANDBOOK (Amy B. Brann ed., Anderson 17th ed. 1997). Conversation with the trial 
judge in late October 1997. See also, Ewinger, supra note 12. 
15 Id. See also supra note 12. 
16LWOP was added to the existing capital sentencing structure by Senate Bill2 and 
Senate Bill269. See Senate Bill2, 1995 Ohio Laws 146; Senate Bill269, 1995 Ohio Laws 
146. 
17The Preface to the seventeenth edition of The Ohio Criminal Law Handbook states 
that it "collects in a compact format" the law for use by judges and attorneys and is 
"designed to be a basic guide to Ohio criminal law." Preface to THE OHIO CRIMINAL LAW 
HANDBOOK (Amy B. Brann ed., Anderson 17th ed. 1997). The text also states that "more 
detailed treatment of criminal law issues can be found" in a volume devoted to practice 
and procedure by the same publisher. I d. The most recent edition likely available to the 
judge was the seventeenth, which included laws amended through November 4, 1996. 
18THE OHIO CRIMJNAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 240 (listing the options as 
LWOP, a life sentence with thirty, or a life sentence with twenty-five years, before parole 
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in The Criminal Law Handbook, the participants in State v. Marshall found a string 
of numbers, dates and abbreviations19 followed by the cryptic statement "[t]he 
effective date is set by section 3 of HB [House Bill]180."20 Section 3 of House 
Bill180 shows January 1, 1997, as the effective date for section 2929.03.21 Having 
no instruction specifying the changes made by the listed bills, the participants 
in State v. Marshall understandably believed that the LWOP sentencing option 
emerged from House Bill 180 and was not applicable to a crime which took 
place on December 22, 1996. 
Unfortunately for Charles Marshall, the Handbook did not explain that House 
Bill 180, the most recent amendment of section 2929.03 applying to crimes 
committed after January 1, 1997, dealt only with sexual predator and sexual 
motivation crimes which were not at issue in this case. Moreover, the Handbook 
did not clearly explain that the life with no parole eligibility for twenty-five 
years provision was in Senate Bill269, enacted much later than Senate Bill2 
but also effective on July 1, 1996. Because the crime was committed after July 
1, 1996, the effective date of Senate Bill222 and Senate Bill 269,23 the penalties 
actually available under section 2929.03 were life imprisonment with parole 
eligibility after serving twenty-five (not twenty) full years, life imprisonment 
with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years, LWOP, or death.24 
Interestingly, the Handbook publisher did try to give some guidance with 
respect to the new sentencing law.25 The publisher restated language from the 
concluding paragraphs of Senate Bill 2 and Senate Bill 269.26 Although the 
eligibility). 
19"History: 134 v 511 (Eff 1-1-74); 139 v S1 (Eff 10-19-81); 146 v S4 (Eff 9-21-95); 146 
v 2 (Eff 7-1-96); 146 v S269 (Eff 7-1-96); 146 H180 (Eff 1-1-97)." THE OHIO CRIMINAL LAW 
HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 241. 
20Jd. 
2l[d. 
22See Senate Bill2, 1995 Ohio Laws 146; Senate Bill269, 1995 Ohio Laws 146. 
23Jd. 
24Jd. Marshall's lawyers requested that the judge provide an instruction regarding 
the no-parole option. Ewinger, supra note 12. Although the judge declined, no one knew 
that the old law-the law he applied to the case-had expired July 1, 1996, with the 
enactment of Senate Bill 2. Id. The request for the no-parole option apparently came 
about due to ongoing litigation over whether Ohio defendants were entitled to the 
beneficial changes brought about by the new sentencing laws if their crimes were 
committed before the effective date of July 1, 1996, but their sentencing occurred after 
the effective date of such statute(s). State v. Marshall, No. CR 349190 (Ohio C.P. 1997). 
Marshall's counsel sought such retroactive application of Senate Bill 2, believing that 
January 1, 1997 was the effective date. Id. In State v. Rush, 697 N.E.2d 634 (1998), the 
Ohio Supreme Court ruled that Senate Bill2's beneficial provisions would not apply to 
crimes committed before July 1, 1996. 
25THE OHio CRIMINAL LAw HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 241. 
26Jd. 
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publisher failed to provide a detailed explanation of how these bills changed 
the law, a small clue at the very end of these technical paragraphs stated, "the 
number [of years for parole eligibility] changed from twenty to twenty-five 
years by SB 269, effective 7-1-96."27 Despite this small tip, no reference told 
when life without parole took effect.28 
One imagines that the publishers of the Handbook hoped judges and lawyers 
would confirm the effective dates of changes in the law and would: (1) read 
the legislative bills as each comes out and track the bills to fruition with 
reference to bill numbers;29 (2) become a member of a professional association 
which tracks legislation and sends out updates which will then be reviewed 
and retained;30 (3) go to a law library and consult the session laws;31 (4) go 
online to the Ohio law databases, such as Gangwer, or Hannah Online through 
OhioLINK;32 5) attend a continuing legal education session on each bill and 
review new materials to retrace the legislative history;33 (6) purchase and 
consult an annotated code volume which provides an extensive legislative 
27Jd. 
28Interestingly, the same Handbook edition made an error in the Table of Penalties 
at page A-1. THE OHIO CRIMINAL LAW HANDBOOK (Amy B. Brann ed., Anderson 17th 
ed. 1996). The Table lists the sentences for post-July 1, 1996 aggravated murder with 
specifications as death, LWOP, life with 30 or life with 20 years. Note, the new law 
changed "life with 20 years" to "life with 25." Id. 
29 As co-chair of the legislative subcommittee of the Ohio State Bar Association's 
Criminal Justice Committee, the author reads every proposed bill relating to criminal 
law, at least in its as-initially-proposed stage. She then abstracts it and provides 
recommendations to the Committee, which then may be forwarded to the State Bar 
Government Affairs Office. Thus, the author has some rudimentary means to track 
possible changes in the law. 
30The Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association tracks legislation in its newsletter; the 
Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers occasionally covers some bills in its 
publication, The Vindicator; and the Ohio State Bar Association Report has a "Legis-letter" 
column which identifies bills by number and summarizes those proposed, passed, 
and/ or signed by the Governor. The Report is available on-line to State Bar members 
at <http:/ /www.ohiobar.org> 
31See Banks-Baldwin's Ohio Legislative Service. 
320hio legislation is available on-line at <http:/ /www.state.oh.us>. Proposed 
legislation is also now available at <http:/ /www.gongwer-oh.com>. Hannah Online is 
available through Ohio LINK at <http:/ /www.ohiolink.edu.> The law is also available 
on Westlaw or Lexis. 
330nly comprehensive bills tend to be the subject of a full-blown continuing legal 
education seminar (hereinafter CLE) in Ohio, although smaller amendments should 
make their way into larger overview-type CLE programs. Given the comprehensive 
nature of the changes in sentencing wrought by Senate Bill2 and Senate Bill269, there 
were day-long CLE's all around the state. The lectures and the materials did briefly 
allude to the changes made in capital sentencing. But their focus was the non-capital 
felony sentencing area, particularly the moves to "Truth-in-Sentencing," definite 
sentences, and sentencing guidelines. Obviously, these CLE's did little to improve 
Charles Marshall's plight. 
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history;34 or (7) consult another more particularized text on Ohio sentencing 
law.35 Realistically, however, few judges or practitioners have the time or 
energy to track all of the legislative changes they may encounter. Although 
judges and litigants have law clerks to assist in such efforts, follow-through is 
sometimes faulty. Thus, handbooks are relied upon, but this presents problems. 
Although handbooks were developed to simplify the process of finding the 
law, these limited texts should not be so condensed that they fail to provide 
needed guidance. Publishers of handbooks need to be more attentive to the 
needs of their users. More comprehensive notes are needed to describe 
legislative changes. If this cannot be done without sacrificing the convenience 
of a single text, then there should be some prominent cross references, or clear 
directions, that another source should be consulted. Otherwise, tragic mistakes 
can and will be made. 
C. Lawmakers Change the Law Too Often, with Too Little Explanation 
Accessing the correct law is made more difficult because the Ohio General 
Assembly keeps changing it. Section 2929.03 of the Ohio Revised Code, for 
example, was changed four times within a sixteen-month period.36 The 
legislature appears to be changing the criminal law so quickly that publishers 
and litigants can not keep up. Further, the legislature is changing the law in 
piecemeal fashion.37 As legislative changes have become more frequent, the 
General Assembly's failure to provide sufficient legislative histories remains a 
serious problem.38 Although legislative history guides litigators in all fields of 
34Banks-Baldwin publishes the Ohio Revised Code with extensive legislative 
histories. However, the legislative history provided in a recent version of Page's Ohio 
Revised Code Annotated for title 29 (November 1996) appears to be less comprehensive. 
These differences in coverage point to a known danger in finding Ohio law: tracking 
legislative changes is risky. 
35See LEWIS KATZ & jUDGE BURT GRIFFIN, OHIO FELONY SENTENCING LAW 
(Banks-Baldwin 1997). This text does relate the proper sentencing provisions and their 
effective dates. Id. at 9. 
36See supra note 19. 
37Both the Ohio Sentencing Commission and the Ohio State Bar Association have 
urged the legislature to make revisions in a more comprehensive manner, and to allow 
the law to settle before further amendments are attempted. See letter from Kathleen B. 
Burke, then-President of the Ohio State Bar Association, to then-Senate President Stanley 
Aronoff (Feb. 22, 1994) (on file with the Cleveland State Law Review). See also Kathleen B. 
Burke, Ohio in Downhill Crime Race, PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 22, 1994, at 7-B, available in 1994 
WL 7229151. 
38Perhaps the legislature would be more sensitive to the litigator's need to find the 
correct law if there were more lawyers serving as legislators. For commentary 
suggesting that more lawyers are needed in the legislature as they know the areas where 
the law needs fixing and can capably draft such legislation, see Alan E. Norris, Bench 
Conference, 2 O.L.W. 843 (1998). However, the number of lawyer-legislators is 
dwindling. Of 132legislators, there are but nine lawyers in the Ohio Senate and twenty-
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol46/iss2/5
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law, the 1974 comprehensive Criminal Code Revision39 marked the last time 
the legislature made such an extended contribution to the operation of the 
criminal justice code. 
Ultimately, the responsibility for avoiding errors in finding the applicable 
law is a shared one. Litigators, judges, law publishers, and the Ohio legislature 
must devote their attention to this problem, as lives are at stake. 
III. RESENTENCING RELIEF: REMEDYING PENALTY PHASE ERROR 
What should happen when, as in Charles Marshall's case, the penalty phase 
jury is grievously misled? Vacating or reversing the death sentence is a 
necessary response. But what then? Where do we go from there? The remainder 
of this article analyzes the concept of seeking death in Ohio following the 
reversal of a jury's death-sentencing decision, as stated in new Ohio Revised 
Code section 2929.06. Ultimately this article concludes that this law is unwise, 
unworkable, and better left alone. 
A. The Prior Law: No Resentencing to Death in Jury-Tried Cases 
In 1987 and 1988, the Ohio Supreme Court construed section 2929.06 of the 
Ohio Revised Code which dealt with resentencing in capital cases. In State 
v. Penix,40 and a subsequent case, State v. Davis,41 the court concluded that 
two forms of resentencing relief existed when errors in the penalty phase 
were uncovered on appeal.42 The for of resentencing relief depended upon 
one in the Ohio House. See Cliff Treyens, Lawyers in the Legislature: An Endangered 
Species, OHio LAWYER, Jan.-Feb., 1998, at 8. 
39 See OHIO CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM'N, A PLAN FOR FELONY SENTENCING IN OHIO 
(1993). Guidance respecting the changes later made in Senate Bill2 and Senate Bill269 
is helpful. But its authoritative value may be limited, for the legislature used it as a source 
of relevant proposals, rather than an explanation of changes made. The earlier 1974 
Legislative Service Commission Notes do appear in the Ohio Criminal Law Handbook for 
litigants and judges. Brann, supra note 14. Indeed, the 1974 Committee Comments to 
House Bill511 appear in the Ohio Criminal Law Handbook. Id. While it is helpful to have 
this guidance into what the 1974 legislature tried to do, there is lingering uncertainty 
whether the Comments even pertain to the law now in effect. Some more current 
legislative memoranda can be obtained on-line or by phone request. Hannah Online, 
accessible through OhioLINK can be used to obtain recent bills. See 
<http://www.ohiolink.edu>. Or one can access the Ohio government website 
<http://www.state.oh.us.> and/or the Legislative Service Committee directly for bill 
analyses of bills introduced in the current and last session of the General Assembly. See 
<http://www.lsc.state.oh.us./ distribution/>. For analyses of older bills, or to get 
analyses of new bills without use of the web, call the Legislative Service Commission 
Library at (614) 466-2241. 
40State v. Penix, 513 N.E.2d 744 (Ohio 1987). 
41State v. Davis, 528 N.E.2d 925 (Ohio 1988). 
42Penix, 513 N.E.2d at 744. 
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whether the defendant had been tried by a jury or a panel of three judges.43 
The Penix court determined that, where a capital defendant had exercised his 
right to a trial by jury,44 a reversal of the penalty phase would lead to a 
resentencing hearing before the trial court judge because there was nos tatu tory 
provision for a resentencing jury.45 The trial judge would be limited to 
resentencing on one of the life sentences.46 The court later held in Davis, where 
a capital defendant had waived his right to a trial by jury in the trial phase and 
appeared before a three-judge court pursuant to section 2929.03 of the Ohio 
Revised Code, a resentencing hearing would be conducted before those judges 
where death would be an option.47 Thus, as interpreted in Penix, Ohio Revised 
Code section 2929.03 permitted the imposition of a death sentence only upon 
the recommendation of the same fact-finder that tried the defendant in the trial 
phase.48 
43Davis, 528 N.E.2d at 925. 
44The right to jury sentencing is provided in OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 
(Anderson 1997). The federal constitution does not guarantee such a right. See Spaziano 
v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984). But most states do provide for jury involvement in capital 
sentencing. See Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1980). Ohio has 
often, but not always, involved the jury in capital sentencing. Death was a mandatory 
punishment for first degree murder from 1815 to 1898, then in 1898 the trial jury was 
given the discretion to accord mercy and a life sentence. See section 12400 of the General 
Code (1898). See also HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 43 (1964). 
When discretionary sentencing was put into question by the United States Supreme 
Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and Ohio's then sentencing practice 
was deemed unconstitutional, the 1974 legislature responded by writing a law to 
exclude the jury from sentencing. See§ 2929.03. When the United States Supreme Court 
declared this judge-sentencing statute unconstitutional for failing to allow adequate 
consideration of mitigating circumstances, see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), the 
Ohio legislature returned to jury involvement in capital sentencing with the current 
version of§ 2929.03 (enacted in 1981). The jury now recommends a death sentence. A 
death sentence recommendation is subject to independent review by the trial judge and 
appellate judges. See§§ 2929.03(D), 2929.05(A). But a jury decision recommending life 
is final and binding on the trial judge. See§ 2929.03(D)(2). 
45Penix, 513 N.E.2d at 744. See also, OHIO REv. CoDE ANN.§ 2929.06(A) (Anderson 
1997). 
46Penix, 513 N.E.2d at 744. The options respecting possible life sentences vary 
depending on the date of the offense. Those who were tried by a jury for a capital crime 
committed before July 1, 1996 could receive a life imprisonment with parole eligibility 
after serving twenty full years or after serving thirty full years. By operation of Senate 
Bill2 and Senate Bill269, for capital crimes committed after July 1, 1996, the life terms 
could be life imprisonment, LWOP, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 
serving thirty full years, or life imprisonment after serving twenty-five full years. By 
operation of House Bill 180, for capital crimes committed after January 1, 1997, if the 
offender was also convicted of or plead guilty to a sexual motivation specification and 
a sexually violent predator specification, only life imprisonment without parole would 
be available on remand. 
47See State v. Davis, 528 N.E.2d 925 (Ohio 1988). 
48Penix, 513 N.E.2d at 744. The court found that Ohio Revised Code section 2929.06 
made no provision for a second jury to make a recommendation on the death penalty 
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B. The Impetus to Change the Resentencing Scheme 
Pursuant to the law in place at the time Penix was decided, resentencing 
hearings conducted before the trial judge following the reversal of a jury death 
sentence were modest proceedings with predictable results.49 The defendant 
was present in most hearings.SO Little or no witness testimony was sought or 
heard regarding the matter of the sentence.Sl Argument by counsel was 
permitted.52 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge generally imposed 
the maximum of the life sentences available by law.53 
This resentencing scheme functioned efficiently and effectively for nearly a 
decade. Then the scheme came under attack by Ohio Attorney General Betty 
Montgomery. Politics caused this tum-about. The Attorney General placed 
at resentencing. Id. The court noted that "[t]here [were] simply no statutory provisions 
for another jury to make these crucial determinations" and "[the court] may not create 
such a procedureoutofwholecloth." Id. The dissent urged that the legislature's omission 
did not preclude the court from fashioning a resentencing jury remedy. I d. Death was 
apparently an option in a case tried to a three judge panel because the judges were 
assumed to be both available and capable of returning a lawful sentence following the 
prior error-laden proceeding. See Davis, 528 N.E.2d 925. The Ohio Supreme Court has 
often presumed that judges will ignore impermissible matter. See State v. Post, 513 
N.E.2d 754 (1987). 
49 A full mitigation hearing within the meaning of section 2929.03 of the Ohio Revised 
Code was not required. See State v. Denson, 586 N.E.2d 1125 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); State 
v. Penix, 586 N.E.2d 127 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989). There have been six cases in which 
jury-recommended death sentences were reversed by the Ohio Supreme Court due to 
penalty phase error and the cause remanded for resentencing. See State v. Penix, 513 
N.E.2d 744 (1987); State v. Zuranski, 513 N.E.2d 753 (1987); State v. Thompson, 514 
N.E.2d 407 (1987); State v. Denson, 531 N.E.2d 674 (1988); State v. Huertas, 553 N.E.2d 
1058 (1990); State v. Brooks, 661 N.E.2d 1030 (1996). In addition, there have been three 
cases where the death sentence was found inappropriate under§ 2929.05(A), and the 
case remanded for imposition of one of the life terms. See State v. Lawrence, 541 N.E.2d 
451 (Ohio 1989); State v. Watson, 572 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio 1991); Statev. Claytor, 574 N.E.2d 
472 (Ohio 1991). Interesting to note, from 1985 to October 26, 1997, the Ohio Supreme 
Court reviewed 151 capital sentence cases. In addition, the federal courts have reversed 
two Ohio jury death sentences. See Scott v. Anderson, 958 F.Supp. 330 (N.D. Ohio 1998); 
Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204 (6th Cir. 1995). Another may soon be reversed. See Mapes 
v. Coyle, Nos. 96-4189,96-4196, 1999 WL 155917 (6th Cir. March 24, 1999) (ordering an 
evidentiary hearing). 
50 Penix, 586 N.E.2d at 127. 
51Anecdotal knowledge from conversations over the years with defense lawyers 
representing resentenced persons. See also State v. Penix, 586 N.E.2d 127 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1989). 
52 Penix, 586 N.E.2d at 127. 
53 Even before a life without parole sentence became available for crimes committed 
after July 1, 1996, resentencing hearings yielded its functional equivalent. A sentence of 
life imprisonment without parole eligibility for twenty or thirty years, combined with 
the consecutive sentences imposed for accompanying crimes, and with the diminished 
life expectancy of those in prison, effectively ensured the defendant would die a natural 
death in prison. 
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significant emphasis on being tough on crime, and she revealed her support of 
the death penalty during her campaign for that office.54 But after she was 
elected, the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the death 
sentence in the first Ohio capital case to reach that court in federal habeas 
proceedings. 55 
In Glenn v. Tate56 the Sixth Circuit found that the defendant's trial counsel 
was ineffective in the penalty phase for failing to investigate and present 
mitigating evidence of the defendant's global brain damage and social 
history.57 The court also criticized the defense for allowing prejudicial 
information to reach the jury.58 As there was a reasonable probability that the 
jury would have returned a life verdict had defense counsel performed 
competently, the court granted relief to Glenn, who had killed a police officer. 59 
The court's decision tarnished the Attorney General's "tough on crime" 
stance. Setting out to mitigate the political damage, the Attorney General 
focused her attention on overturning the Sixth Circuit decision. When that 
failed, she set out to overturn the statute that precluded the State from seeking 
death again.60 She successfully urged the legislature to rewrite Ohio Revised 
Code section 2929.06, and this led eventually to the passing of Senate Bill258.61 
C. The Change- Senate Bill 258 Rewrites Section 2929.06 of the 
Ohio Revised Code 
Senate Bi11258 rewrote section 2929.06 for crimes committed after its effective 
date of October 16, 1996. The revision allows the prosecution tore-seek death 
for resentencing proceedings"[ where] the sentence of death that [was] imposed 
upon an offender is vacated upon appeal because of error that occurred in the 
sentencing phase of the triai."62 
54 See Randy Ludlow, Crime Focus of Fisher & Montgomery, CINCINNATI PosT, Nov. 3, 
1994, at lOA, available in 1994 WL 7140228 (referencing candidate Montgomery's tough 
on crime stance); see also Fisher For Attorney General, PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 2, 1994, at 2-C, 
available in 1994 WL 10771974 (referencing candidate Montgomery's support for 
shortening the death penalty appeals process). 
55Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 273 (1996). 
56Id. 
57Jd. at 1205,1207-1208, 1210-11. 
58Jd. at 1210. 
59Jd. at 1210-11. 
60Alan Johnson, State Targets 'Loophole' in Death Cases, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 4, 
1996, at 1-B, available in 1996 WL 6184210. 
61Alan Johnson, Legal Loophole to Avoid Death Penalty Closed, 5 State Crime Bills, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 18, 1996, at 6C, available in 1996 WL 11017619. 
62Senate Bill258left unchanged a portion of section 2929.06 which mandated a life 
sentence o~ remand if a death sentence is reversed on appeal because it is inappropriate 
under section 2929.05 of the Ohio Revised Code. That section mandates a death sentence 
be reversed on appeal if no statutory aggravating circumstance was proven beyond a 
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol46/iss2/5
1998] Section 2929.06 of the Ohio Revised Code 273 
Senate Bill 258 provides but a cursory description of the trier of fact in the 
resentencing proceedings it creates. "The trial court that sentenced the offender 
shall conduct a new hearing to resentence the offender. If the offender was tried 
by a jury, the trial court shall impanel a new jury for the hearing."63 
Senate Bill258 also codifies the practice that resentencings were available if 
the defendant had waived a jury and been tried by a three-judge panel:64 the 
"original panel, or if necessary, a new panel of three judges" conducts the 
resentencing.65 Senate Bill258 simply directs the court to follow the procedure 
set forth in section 2929.03(D) as to the content of the resentencing 
proceeding.66 
D. Senate Bill 258 and the Marshall Case 
State v. Marshall was to be the first Ohio case to test Senate Bill 258, but 
ultimately it failed to explore the inherent problems within the new law. Mr. 
Marshall's case never went to appeal.67 Rather, it was the trial judge who 
vacated the death sentence68 and ordered a new penalty phase pursuant to 
Senate Bill 258.69 Thereafter, the judge immediately recused himself from the 
case, as he had already announced a judgment of death on Mr. Marshall?O 
Apparently, the judge was concerned about the appearance of partiality at the 
new proceeding?l After the judge recused himself, the defense filed a motion 
for new trial based on various errors and on newly discovered evidence alleged 
reasonable doubt, or if the statutory aggravating circumstances did not outweigh the 
mitigating factors by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or if the sentence was excessive 
when compared to that imposed in similar cases, or if the defendant was not eighteen 
years of age at the time of the offense. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 2929.05 (Anderson 
1997). When the death sentence is reversed as inappropriate on any of these grounds, a 
life sentence is imposed on remand. That was the law and remains the law. Senate Bill 
258 simply describes a new category of reversals of the death sentence, a category which 
allows death to be re-sought. 
630HIO REv. CoDE ANN.§ 2929.06(A)(2) (Anderson 1997). 
64See State v. Davis, 528 N.E.2d 925 (Ohio 1988). 
65§ 2929.06(A)(2). 
66 I d. Again, that provision speaks to the "trial jury" and "trial judge." See§ 2929.03(D). 
Thus, melding the two statutes may yet be awkward. 
67Indeed, there is no final judgment from which an appeal may be taken in a capital 
case until the trial judge has prepared and filed a sentencing opinion setting forth the 
reasons for his sentence. See§ 2929.03(F). This had not been filed when the trial judge 
ordered a new penalty proceeding. 
68James Ewinger, New Jury Ordered to Decide Sentence Pizzeria Murder Conviction 
Stands, PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 15, 1997, at B-1, B-4, available in 1997 WL 6619045. 
69 Id. at B-1. 
70Jd. 
71Jd. at B-4. 
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to affect the trial phase of the proceedings.72 The defense also filed objections 
to the state's ability tore-seek death at the resentencing proceeding.73 After a 
hearing, the newly assigned trial judge granted the motion for a new trial?4 
While the Marshall case will not go forward as a penalty-only retrial, it still 
presents an opportunity to examine the operation of Senate Bill 258. 
E. Senate Bill 258's Accrual Point 
Section 2929.06(A)(2) of the Ohio Revised Code and indeed all of the statute 
appears to apply only "if the sentence of death that is imposed upon an offender 
is vacated upon appeal." Mr. Marshall's case had not proceeded to appeal?S 
Rather, it was the trial judge who vacated the death sentence. An argument 
may well be made that without a reversal on appeal, there is no statutory 
authority to conduct a resentencing proceeding where death is an option. The 
defense may potently argue the absence of statutory authority prompts a 
re-invocation and re-application of the Penix rationale (that no resentencing 
structure exists in this context and one cannot create it from whole cloth), thus 
mandating a life sentence. 
F. Double Jeopardy and Penalty Phase Mistrials 
Furthermore, vacating Mr. Marshall's death sentence and ordering a new 
penalty phase where death was an option appears to raise double jeopardy 
concems.76 The judge's actions may properly be viewed as akin to a mistrial 
after the penalty phase?? If one approaches the situation as a mistrial, a 
question arises whether there was manifest necessity to dismiss the jury and 
order a new proceeding. If no manifest necessity is present, then double 
jeopardy would preclude seeking death in a further proceeding, as the 
defendant had a right to have his fate determined by that jury.78 If the jurors 
recommended a life sentence for Charles Marshall, this would have been bind-
720rder of December 12, 1997, Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Case No. 
CR 349190. These motions were initially filed during trial. 
73Motions and briefs were filed on behalf of both parties in the month prior to the 
order that was dated December 12, 1997. See State v. Marshall, No. CR 349190 (Ohio C.P. 
1997). 
74Jd. The state appealed to the court of appeals, but the appeal was dismissed. As of 
this writing, the new trial has not yet begun. 
75See supra note 67. 
76Defendants may not be twice placed in jeopardy of life or limb. See U.S. CONST. 
amend. V; OHIO CONST. art. I,§ 10. 
77 See e.g., Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981 ); c.f, Arizona v. Washington, 434 
U.S. 497,505 (1978); Harpster v. Ohio, 128 F.3d 322, 329 (6th Cir. 1997). 
78Jd. 
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ing on the trial judge, and a life sentence would have been imposed?9 There is 
a real likelihood in the Marshall case that, had the jurors been properly 
instructed on life without parole, a life sentence would have been the sentence 
recornrnended.80 The defense may argue, therefore, that this jury should have 
been allowed to reconsider the sentence with proper instructions and that a 
mistrial was not necessary.81 
Senate Bill258's apparent limitation to sentences vacated on appeal may be 
a concern as other cases arise where penalty phase errors are quickly 
recognized and promptly addressed by trial judges. Litigants and judges 
should also be sensitive to the double jeopardy issues that may arise in trying 
to remedy these errors at the trial level. 
IV. PROBLEMS AND COSTS GENERATED BY THE NEW RESENTENCING 
OPTION IN SENATE BILL 258 
Following a brief description of Ohio's bifurcation scheme, the remainder of 
this article suggests that jury penalty retrials will lead to more challenges in the 
courts, may well waste limited judicial and criminal justice system resources, 
may prove unworkable in practice, and are not likely to serve the interests of 
79See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(2) (Anderson 1997). "While a 
recommendation by the jury that the death penalty be imposed must be reviewed and 
re-weighed by the trial and appellate courts, a jury decision to impose life imprisonment 
is final." Penix, 513 N.E.2d 744. 
80 See Ewinger, supra note 12. It appears the jurors discussed LWOP and some favored 
it, though the option was not given them. Id. 
81 The fact that the trial judge had clearly approved the jury's death recommendation 
could be viewed as a possible taint on their reconsideration. But the defense was not 
given an opportunity to inquire whether the jurors could put this aside. In double 
jeopardy mistrial cases involving manifest necessity, prosecutors sometimes urge that 
the defense consented to a mistrial and double jeopardy concerns are waived. But, for 
consent to be found, defense counsel must have been provided the opportunity to "retain 
primary control over the course to be followed in the event of error." United States v. 
Dinitz,424 U.S. 600,609 (1976). Courts expect "the circumstances [to] positively indicate 
a willingness to acquiesce in the mistrial order." Weston v. Kernan, 50 F.3d 633,637 (9th 
Cir. 1995). Courts will consider whether some mechanism should have been used to 
allow the first jury the opportunity to stay on the case. See, e.g., United States v. Gaytan, 
115 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 1997). Whether the defense was provided an opportunity to 
explore returning the original jury to a position where it could deliberate on LWOP and 
whether this could have resulted in a fair sentencing decision are lingering issues in this 
case. It should be noted that the defense motion to preclude death on double jeopardy 
grounds was denied at the same time the new trial motion was granted on December 
12, 1997. Under present Ohio law, the defense can not pursue an interlocutory appeal 
of the denial of a double jeopardy motion to dismiss. Wenzel v. Enright, 623 N.E.2d 69 
(Ohio 1993). It may be possible to pursue federal habeas corpus relief in the pre-trial 
period to protect the interest in not being re-tried that is the core nature of the double 
jeopardy protection. See Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881 (4th Cir. 1996). As of this writing, 
federal habeas review has not been sought in Charles Marshall's case. If the new trial 
should proceed with death as an option, and if death is ultimately imposed, the double 
jeopardy issue may well be raised in appellate and/ or later federal habeas proceedings. 
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justice. A prosecutor attempting to assure justice and make efficient use of 
judicial resources would be well-advised to simply decline the legislature's 
recent invitation to seek death again. 
A. Ohio's Bifurcation Scheme 
Unlike other states which conduct resentencing proceedings,82 Ohio has a 
legislative framework that requires all aggravating circumstances or factors be 
pled and proven at the trial phase of the case.83 These aggravating factors are 
later weighed against mitigating factors at the time of sentencing in the penalty 
phase.84 In other words, Ohio bifurcates the finding and weighing of 
aggravating circumstances. These are found in the trial phase, but used in the 
penalty phase.BS 
Ohio's bifurcation scheme has many advantages. Ohio's system is simple, 
as the death-eligibility issue(s) and the aggravating circumstance(s) needed for 
sentence determinations are the same and need only be proven once. State 
witnesses need not testify again at the penalty phase, as is true in other 
jurisdictions where no findings of aggravation are made until the penalty 
phase.86 By the penalty phase, the aggravating factors are clear, supported, and 
82Many states provide by statute for resentencing proceedings. See e.g., ALA. CODE 
§ 13A-5-53 (1995); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.01 (West 1997); ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 5-4-616 (Michie 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 53a-466 (West 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit 11, sec. 492 (1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 921.141 (1997); GA. CODE ANN.§ 17-10-35 (1997); 
IDAHO CODE§ 19-2827 (1997); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.§ 5/9-1 (West 1997); IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 35-50-2-9 (Michie 1997); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.075 (Banks-Baldwin 1997); Mo. 
CoDE ANN.,§ 1957 (1997); MISS. CODE ANN.§ 99-19-105 (1997); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 565.035 
(West 1997); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 46-18-904 (1997); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 29-2521.03 
(Michie 1997); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:ll-3 (West 
1997); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 31-11-16 (Michie 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 15A-2000 (1997); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 701.13 (West 1997); OR. REv. STAT. § 163.150 (1997); 42 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 9711 (West 1997); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 16-3-25 (Law Co-op. 1997); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS§ 23A-27 A-13 (Michie 1997); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 39-13-206 (1997); UTAH 
CODE ANN.§ 76-3-207 (1997); VA. CODE ANN.§ 19.2-264.3 (Michie 1997); WASH. REv. 
CODE ANN.§ 10.95.140 (West 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 6-2-103 (Michie 1997). 
830Hio REv. CoDE ANN.§ 2941.14 (Anderson 1997); § 2929.03(C)(2)(a). 
84§ 2929.03(0). 
850ther states have both the aggravating and mitigating factors to be weighed and 
proven at the trial phase. While two other states allow aggravating or special 
circumstances to be proven at the trial phase, both of these states allow additional factors 
or circumstances in aggravation to be proven and weighed at the penalty phase. See 
ALA. CoDE§ 13A-5-40 (1995); CAL PENAL CoDE§ 190.2 (West 1997). See also Lindsey v. 
Smith, 820 F.2d 1137 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. den. 489 U.S. 1059 (1989) (allowing judge to 
consider non-statutory aggravating factors); CAL. PENAL CoDE § 190.3 (West 1997) 
(allowing sentencer to consider any matter in aggravation). 
86Thomas M. Flemming, Annotation, Sufficiency of Evidence, for Purposes of Death 
Penalty, to Establish Statutory Aggravating Circumstance That Defendant Was Previously 
Convicted of or Committed Other Violent Offense, Had HistoryofViolent Conduct, Posed Threat 
to Society, and the Like-Post-Gregg Cases, 66 A.L.R. 4TH 838 (1989); Thomas M. Flemming, 
Annotation, Sufficiency of Evidence, for Purposes of Death Penalty, to Establish Statutory 
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distinct.87 The Ohio procedure facilitates reliability in the determination of the 
aggravating factors, as the resources and adversarial tools utilized are the same 
as those used at trial on other issues. Aggravating factors are subject to the 
standard notice, discovery, disclosure,88 submission of evidence, jury 
instructions, deliberation and verdict practice. Furthermore, appellate review 
is more effective and efficient, because the determination of specific 
aggravating factors narrows the issues. Therefore, in Ohio aggravating factors 
are more reliably determined and the penalty phase is simplified and 
stream-lined. 
Ohio's bifurcation scheme provides substantial benefits in every capital 
prosecution, and the 1981 legislature was wise to adopt it. The General 
Assembly wisely refrained from attempting to establish a jury penalty retrial 
practice to deal with the rare incidents of penalty phase errors, as the benefits 
Ohio regularly receives from its bifurcation scheme outweigh the desire to 
recapture the rare penalty reversal case. But the recent adoption of Senate Bill 
258 threatens the reliability and efficient operation of this framework and must 
be carefully assessed. 
B. Problems with the New Resentencing Statute 
Jury penalty retrials may well jeopardize the constitutional framework so 
carefully crafted by the 1981 legislature. The Eighth Amendment and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution, and comparable 
provisions under Article I, Sections 9,10 and 16 of the Ohio constitution, protect 
Ohio citizens from cruel and unusual punishments and ensure that the State 
Aggravating Circumstance That Murder Was Committed to Avoid Arrest or Prosecution, to 
Effect Escape From Custody, to Hinder Governmental Function or Enforcement of Law, and the 
Like-Post-Gregg Cases, 64 A.L.R. 4TH 755 (1989); Thomas M. Flemming, Annotation, 
Sufficiency of Evidence, for Purposes of Death Penalty, to Establish Statutory Aggravating 
Circumstance That in Committing Murder, Defendant Created Risk of Death or Injun; to More 
Than One Person, Many Persons, and the Like-Post-Gregg Cases, 64 A.L.R. 4TH 837 (1989). 
The state often calls no witnesses at the penalty phase in Ohio, as their side of the case 
is already proven. The state may call witnesses to rebut the defense claim that a 
mitigating factor is present, State v. DePew, 528 N.E.2d 542 (Ohio 1989), but even this 
is uncommon. 
87The parties have a clearer understanding of what the penalty phase will entail as 
there has been early disclosure of aggravating factors and these have been proven. 
88The indictment in an Ohio capital murder case must contain at least one of the 
specified aggravating circumstances contained in section 2929.04 (A)(1-9) of the Ohio 
Revised Code or the case will not proceed as a capital case. See § 2941.14. The 
aggravating factors are subject to bills of particulars and discovery provisions in rule 
7(E) and 16 of the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure. For an example of the difficulties 
that can be presented in jurisdictions which do not abide by notice requirements 
respecting the intent to seek death, see Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110 (1991). 
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must adhere to the mandates of due process and equal protection when 
engaged in the taking of human life.89 As demonstrated below, Senate Bill258 
may fail these constitutional requirements. 
1. Due Process and Aggravating Factors 
Because Senate Bill 258 permits a new sentencing jury to determine the 
defendant's sentence during a penalty retrial, and because the new jury must 
determine the significance or weight to be accorded aggravating factors that 
were found at trial,90 a penalty retrial under Senate Bill 258 creates 
constitutional questions. The death penalty process must be reliable and fair, 
89See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); State v. Jenkins, 473 N.E.2d 264 (Ohio 
1984). To comport with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, there must be "a 
measured, consistent application" of the death penalty assuring "fairness to the 
accused." Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 111 (1982). Death sentences which are 
arbitrarily or capriciously imposed, due to freakish or infrequent imposition, bias, or 
discriminatory application, cannot be upheld under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,309-10 (1976). Appellate review is 
expected to "serve as a check against the random and arbitrary imposition of the death 
penalty," as a "sentence which is imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or 
any other arbitrary factor" cannot be tolerated. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 204, 206. The 
requirement of aggravating factors is another check on arbitrariness. "To avoid [the] 
constitutional flaw of [vagueness and overbreadth under the Eighth Amendment], a 
jurisdiction must specify aggravating factors which "genuinely narrow the class of 
persons eligible for the death penalty" and "reasonably justify the imposition of a more 
severe sentence on a defendant as compared to others found guilty of murder." Zant v. 
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1980). Aggravating factors serve as eligibility criteria for the 
death sentence, channel discretion, and are a means of rationally distinguishing those 
cases in which life is imposed and those in which the death sentence may be imposed. 
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,433 (1980). Furthermore, individualized sentencing is 
required. "In a separate penalty proceeding, the sentencer must be permitted to consider 
as a mitigating factor any aspect of the defendant's character or record and any of the 
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less 
than death." Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). Mandatory death sentencing, 
which automatically imposes the death penalty for commission of a particular crime, is 
unconstitutional as it fails to look to the individual offender and offense. Woodson v. 
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 n.7 (1976 ). The nature and circumstances of the offense, 
or simply the inadequacy of the crime or the evidence to call for death, are relevant in 
mitigation. A sentencer's opposition to a particular aggravating circumstance is also a 
legitimate consideration for imposing a life sentence, as it represents "factors which may 
call for a less severe penalty." Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605. Further, a "qualitative difference" 
exists between death and other forms of punishment, as death is unique it its severity 
and irrevocability." Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305. This quality of irrevocability has meant 
more process is due the capital defendant, and the system requires a correspondingly 
"greater degree of reliability in the determination of guilt or innocence and in the 
determination of the appropriate punishment." Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604-5; Beck v. 
Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 (1980). 
900hio Revised Code section 2929.03(D)(1) states "[t]he prosecution shall have the 
burden of proving, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating 
circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing are sufficient to outweigh 
the factors in mitigation of the imposition of the death sentence." 
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and it must yield consistent results.91 Reliability and fairness cannot be 
achieved, however, if the new jury is left to speculate about the aggravating 
factors and the weight to be accorded them. Thus, because the evidence 
supporting the aggravating factors is not before the new jury, it is not in a 
position to fairly weigh the previously determined aggravating factors against 
the about-to-be presented mitigating circumstances.92 One side of the scale is 
missing. And to make matters worse, the possible solutions to this problem are 
not trouble-free. 
In order to come close to a fair and reliable proceeding, the state would have 
to present the aggravating factors by re-introducing evidence.93 But 
introducing impermissible evidence could spoil the new penalty phase. By law, 
the Ohio jury's consideration of evidence is strictly limited.94 Aggravating 
factors must be specified in the indictment, proven beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and non-duplicative of one another.95 Facts beyond the proven statutory 
aggravating circumstance, including the nature and circumstances of the 
crime, are not properly part of the evidence in aggravation.96 Admission of, or 
91Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 973 (1994) (noting that procedures must 
"minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action"). 
92It is not enough that a different jury previously determined that an aggravating 
factor existed. This does not answer whether the aggravating factors are sufficient to 
call for the death sentence, or sufficient to outweigh the particular mitigating 
circumstances presented in a given case. For example, in State v. Lawrence, 541 N.E.2d 
451 (Ohio 1989), the Ohio Supreme Court found the death sentence was inappropriate 
where a commonly-charged aggravating circumstance that had been proven at the trial 
phase was found to be outweighed by the mitigating factors in the case. See Lockett v. 
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,605 (1978). 
93The prosecutor in the Charles Marshall case recognized this, and announced his 
intent to re-call each of the twenty witnesses who had testified in the trial phase of the 
case for the then-expected jury penalty retrial. See James Ewinger, New Jury Ordered to 
Decide Sentence Pizzeria Murder Conviction Stands, PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 15, 1997, at B-4, 
available in 1997 WL 6619045. As the Marshall jury penalty retrial was to follow on the 
heels of the initial trial, the Marshall prosecutor could at least expect his witnesses to be 
available. 
94The Ohio Supreme Court has made it clear that consideration must attend only the 
aggravating factors identified in section 2929.04(A) of the Ohio Revised Code. See State 
v. Johnson, 494 N.E.2d 1061 (Ohio 1986). Section 2929.03(D)(1) of the Ohio Revised Code 
limits the sentencer's consideration of aggravating circumstances to "any evidence 
raised at trial that is relevant to the aggravating circumstances the offender was found 
guilty of committing" and the presentation of testimony and other evidence to that 
which is "relevant to the nature and circumstances of the aggravating circumstances the 
offender was found guilty of committing." I d. 
95State v. Jenkins, 473 N.E.2d 264 (Ohio 1984). 
96Consideration of non-statutory aggravating circumstances is not permitted in 
Ohio. See State v. Johnson, 494 N.E.2d 1061 (Ohio 1986); State v. Jenkins,473 N.E.2d 264 
(Ohio 1984); State v. Cooey, 544 N.E.2d 895 (Ohio 1989); cf, Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 
939 (1983). The crime of aggravated murder itself, for example, is not an aggravating 
circumstance, and is not to be weighed. State v. Henderson, 528 N .E.2d 1237 (Ohio 1989). 
Only the accompanying features of the aggravated murder, as stated in section 
19Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1998
280 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:261 
argument on impermissible matter would risk a reversal of the penalty phase.97 
A prosecutor would therefore have to tip-toe with extreme caution in trying to 
present information to a new sentencing jury. 
Furthermore as the state would have to re-introduce much, if not all, of the 
evidence respecting aggravating factors, the defense would be entitled to 
cross-examine the state's witnesses.98 Thus, a new penalty retrial would not 
only demand testimony from witnesses speaking to the issue of mitigation. It 
would also demand the re-introduction of trial evidence to allow the new jury 
to weigh aggravating factors against all mitigating circumstance evidence 
presented. 
2. Lack of Timeliness: Justice Delayed Is Justice Denied 
In addition to the problems outlined above, another potential problem 
emerges. When penalty reversals are declared on appeal (the accrual point of 
Senate Bill258), the jury penalty retrial takes place years later. The lapse of time 
between the trial and the resentencing, and the possibility of loss of witnesses 
to both sides, presents significant questions about the fairness and reliability 
of this effort. 
2929.04(A) of the Ohio Revised Code, are to be weighed in determining sentence. The 
Henderson court explained, "[t]he balance is not between the mitigating factors and the 
intentional killing of an innocent person. What the jury is balancing are any mitigating 
factors present in the case against the separate and distinct factors, termed 'aggravating 
circumstances,' enumerated in R.C. 2929.04(A)(1) through [(9)]." Henderson, 528 N.E.2d 
at 1237. Further, the nature and circumstances of the crime "may only enter into the 
statutory weighing process on the side of mitigation." State v. Wogenstahl, 662 N.E.2d 
311 (Ohio 1996). 
97 All death sentences obtained by jury re-sentencing are reviewed in the Ohio 
Supreme Court, pursuant to Ohio Revised Code section 2929.05. The intermediate 
appellate courts have no jurisdiction to hear death-sentence cases on direct appeal if the 
crime was committed after January 1, 1995. See§ 2929.05; see also State v. Smith, 684 
N.E.2d 688 (Ohio 1997). If the death sentence is upheld in the Ohio Supreme Court, 
review would be pursued in the United States Supreme Court on certiorari, in the state 
courts through state post-conviction relief pursuant to Ohio Revised Code section 
2953.21, and in the federal courts through federal habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2241-2254. 
98Due process requires that the defendant have an opportunity to deny, rebut, or 
explain the state's presentation of evidence respecting aggravating circumstances. See 
Gardner v. Florida,430 U.S. 349 (1977); Skipperv. South Carolina,476 U.S. 1 (1986). The 
defense has a right to cross-examine witnesses and present rebuttal respecting the 
presence and weight to be given aggravating factor, just as had been their right at the 
trial phase. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994). First-time penalty phases 
have not generally engaged this need, because the weight of the aggravation is 
ascertained through the trial phase testimony, and the defense simply presents its 
evidence in mitigation and the prosecution is provided an opportunity for rebuttal of 
the evidence in mitigation. See State v. DePew, 528 N.E.2d 542 (Ohio 1989). 
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3. Lack of Fairness 
In the past, there have been instances when defense counsel have sought a 
less conviction-prone jury by challenging the prosecution's practice of 
death-qualifying a jury prior to trial.99 Their efforts were rejected,lOO allegedly 
to conserve resources.lOl By adopting Senate Bill258, however, the legislature 
has now acknowledged that a second jury is resource-possible. Ohio courts 
may yet recognize the inherent injustice in supporting the State's demands 
(made in the name of conserving resources) for a conviction-prone and less 
representative jury the first time around, and then granting the State the option 
of getting a new jury (and expending even greater resources), where a serious 
error (often of their making) occurs during the penalty phase. Given a 
defendant's right to a fair, impartial, and representative jury, future defense 
arguments will undoubtedly assert that the scales of justice should not be 
tipped so dramatically in the State's favor. 
99See State v. Jenkins, 473 N.E.2d 264 (Ohio 1984); State v. Mapes, 484 N.E.2d 140 
(Ohio 1985). Death-qualifying is the process of removing those jurors who have views 
against the death penalty that would substantially impair their ability to impose a death 
sentence. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985); cf, OHio REv. CoDE ANN.§ 2945.25 
(C) (Anderson 1997) (noting that a cause challenge based on death penalty views is to 
meet a standard similar to that in the earlier case of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 
(1968)). Witherspoon held that a prospective juror must make it unmistakably clear that 
he will automatically vote against death. Witt, 469 U.S. at 412. Challenges to 
"death-qualification" have been based on empirical studies which suggest jurors who 
survive the selection process will be more conviction-prone and less representative of 
the community. SeestudiescitedinGrigsbyv. Mabry,569F.Supp.1273 (E.D. Ark.1983); 
affd, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985), reversed, Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986). 
Although the United States Supreme Court questioned these studies, the Court assumed 
that the death-qualification process resulted in a jury more likely to convict the 
defendant. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 173. The Court also concluded that the process reduced 
the number of women jurors and African-American jurors, jurors who were less likely 
to believe the prosecution's witnesses. Id. 
100Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 173. Many strategies had been attempted. See PUBLIC 
DEFENDER COMM'N, "MOTION TO PROHIBIT DEATH QuALIFICATION OF JURY, OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, TO SEAT A SEPARATE JURY DURING PENALTY PHASE OF TRIAL" IN MOTIONS 
MANUAL FOR CAPITAL CASES VIII-50- VIII-62 (Gleespen & McGarry eds., 4th ed. 1991). 
The Commision urged that death-qualification take place only after the jury has 
returned a conviction. Id. It also asserted that a greater number of alternates should be 
chosen at the outset of the trial phase to replace those who may be excluded by death 
qualification, or alternatively, that a separate penalty phase jury should be seated. Id. 
See also OHIO DEATH PENALTY TASK FORCE, PuBLIC DEFENDER COMM'N, "MOTION TO 
PROHIBIT DEATH QuALIFICATION OF JURY, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO SEAT A SEPARATE 
JURY DURING PENALTY PHASE OF TRIAL" IN MOTIONS MANUAL FOR CAPITAL CASES 29-39 
(Koosed & Stebbins eds., 1983). 
101See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986). 
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4. Another Problem: New Jurors Will Not Harbor Residual 
Doubts About Guilt 
Aside from the potential constitutional problems created by seating a new 
jury, there is the concern that a new jury will not carry residual or lingering 
doubts about choosing a guilty verdict.l02 When refusing to require a separate 
death-qualified jury, the United States Supreme Court suggested that a single 
jury assured that a defendant was able to have the sentencing jury consider its 
residual doubts about guilt when deciding punishment.103 A jury that had not 
heard the trial phase could not accord the defendant the benefit of lingering 
doubts about guilt which may make the death sentence inappropriate.104 Until 
recently, this was considered a meaningful, relevant mitigating factor in Ohio, 
and it should be so again,lOS Conducting a jury penalty retrial with a new jury 
102Residual doubts about guilt may be kept within the jury's deliberations, or may 
on occasion surface. In a recent Cleveland case, during the period between the trial and 
penalty phases, a jury foreman told the prosecutor and a detective about his doubts 
regarding the verdict. See James Ewinger, Jury Meets to Decide Sentence in Two Killings, 
PLAIN DEALER, June 19, 1998, at 3-B. The foreman's doubts apparently arose from witness 
credibility problems. Id. The prosecutor asked the judge to remove the foreman or 
dismiss the entire jury and allow the penalty phase to proceed before the trial judge 
alone. The judge denied both requests. Id. The penalty phase proceeded, and after 
several days of deliberation, the jury was unable to unanimously agree on a death 
sentence. See James Ewinger, Jury Unable to Agree on Sentence For Slayings, PLAIN DEALER, 
June 21, 1998, at 2-B. This resulted in a life sentence, by operation of section 2929.03(D) 
of the Ohio Revised Code. See OHio REv. CODE ANN.§ 2929.03(D) (Anderson 1997). 
103Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 181. 
104See State v. Watson, 572 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio 1971), abrogated by State v. McGuire, 686 
N.E.2d 1112 (Ohio 1997) (holding that "residual doubt" is not an acceptable mitigating 
factor under capital sentencing statute, since it is irrelevant to issue of whether defendant 
should be sentenced to death); see also State v. Garner, 656 N.E.2d 623 (1995) (holding 
that counsel may argue residual doubt, though jury need not be instructed on it); cf 
Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1987) (noting in dicta that some forms of residual 
doubt need not be considered); Jennifer R. Treadway, Residual Doubt in Capital 
Sentencing: No Doubt It Is an Appropriate Mitigation Factor, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 215 
(1992); Margery B. Koosed, Residual Doubt in the Post-Franklin v. Lynaugh Era, THE 
CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 38-44; Margery B. Koosed, Franklin v. Lynaugh: Can 
Lingering Doubt Linger Longer?, THE CHAMPION, Nov. 1988, at 46-52. 
105In State v. McGuire, 686 N.E.2d 1112 (1997), the Ohio Supreme Court reversed its 
earlier acceptance of residual doubt as a relevant mitigating factor under section 
2929.04(B) of the Ohio Revised Code. The court held that Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 
164 (1987), did not require states to allow a defendant the opportunity to argue residual 
doubt. McGuire, 686 N.E.2d at 1122-23. This holding appears to overstate the Franklin 
decision, which dealt merely with the narrowness of jury instructions. See Koosed, supra 
note 104. Franklin did not deal with the ability of defense counsel to argue residual doubt. 
Id. Further, it is illogical to suggest that such doubt is not germane to whether the 
offender should be sentenced to death. See McGuire, 686 N.E.2d at 1124 (Pfeiffer, J., and 
Moyer, J., concurring). Indeed, the Model Penal Code section 210.6 actually precludes 
death if the evidence fails to foreclose all doubt about guilt. See MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 210.6 (1962). See also Margery B. Koosed, Some Perspectives on the Possible Impact of 
Diminished Federal Review of Ohio Death Sentences, 19 CAP. U. LAw REv. 695, 777 (1990) 
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who has not heard the trial evidence raises the issue of whether one can 
reconstruct those doubts that may have been present in the minds of the 
?riginal jury. Thus, in order to provide a fair determination on such mitigation, 
rt should be necessary to present trial evidence that addressed the question of 
whether the defendant was assuredly guilty of aggravated murder, not merely 
whether the defendant was guilty of the aggravating circumstances. 
5. The Costs of Retrials Under Senate Bill258 
Assuming that the prosecution and defense could somehow reconstruct the 
case to meet all of these concerns, the retrial process will be very costly. 
a. Retrying the Entire Case 
Senate Bill 258 retrials may well fail to achieve the degree of reliability and 
consistency necessary in a capital case. Jury penalty retrials create the 
substantial risk that aggravating factors will be the subject of mere speculation, 
that the ability to consider relevant mitigating factors will be undeniably 
impaired, and that arbitrary inconsistent decision-making will result. Thus, all 
indications point to only one conceivable remedy for the risks generated by the 
new law: the entire case must be retried. 
The necessity to essentially retry the entire trial phase case, as well as the 
penalty phase, raises serious public policy concerns for prosecutors and the 
courts. When one considers the time needed for jury selection, the 
re-introduction of evidence, argument, instructions, and deliberations, one 
quickly realizes that the expense of retrying these cases will be enormous, as 
capital cases consume more judicial, prosecutorial, and defense resources than 
any other class of cases.l06 
(noting that public opinion polls repeatedly recognize the abiding concern that an 
innocent person not be wrongly executed). To suggest that the citizens of Ohio would 
ignore this risk of erroneous execution is contrary to human experience. As the Ohio 
Supreme Court stated several years ago in a different context, "[w ]e would be naive not 
to recognize that those matters which occur in the guilt phase carry over and become 
part and parcel of the entire proceeding as the penalty phase is entered." State v. 
Thompson, 514 N.E.2d 407,421 (Ohio 1987). 
106See DEATH PENALlY lNFOR. CTR., MILUONS MISSPENT: WHAT POLffiCIANS DoN'T SAY 
ABOUT THE HIGH COSTS OF THE DEATH PENAL 1Y (Oct. 1992). See also COYNE & ENTZEROTH, 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 81-85 (1994). While no comparison of 
the specifics of retrial cost as compared to life imprisonment are available, several 
articles compare the costs of the death penalty and life imprisonment generally. See, e.g., 
D. Von Drehle, Bottom Line: Life in Prison One-Sixth as Expensive, MIAMI HERALD, July 
10, 1988, at 12 A (noting that the State of Florida is spending an average $3.2 million per 
execution); C. Hoppe, Executions Cost Texas Millions, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, March 8, 
1992, at 1A (noting that, in Texas, a death penalty conviction costs an average of $2.3 
million dollars, about three times the cost of imprisoning someone for forty years in a 
single cell at the highest security level). 
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b. Compounding the Costs-When the New jury Decides Against Death 
Prosecutors need to consider whether they will be successful in re-seeking 
death. As demonstrated above, the costs are heavy, a fact which is compounded 
when one considers that a death sentence may not be achieved. Prosecutors 
must remember that to reverse a death sentence, significant error must have 
occurred. These cases are not reversed on technicalities-they are reversed 
when there is a genuine concern that had the case been tried properly, the result 
would have been otherwise.107 Furthermore, to elect a new death sentence the 
new jury must unanimously recommend death.l08 Retrying these cases and 
seeking a death sentence may well waste resources for, inherent in the reversal, 
is the recognition that a life sentence would be likely in any retrial.l09 
c. More Appeals at More Cost 
The resource costs of Senate Bill 258 do not end with the jury penalty retrial 
itself. Any death sentence imposed will be subject to automatic appeal in the 
Ohio Supreme Court, and likely post-conviction remedies in the state and 
federal courts if not overturned in the direct appeal process.llO And not only 
will jury penalty retrials lead to more appeals of death sentences, but it will 
likely increase the number of cases in which further appeals are sought relating 
to trial phase issues.lll 
107This means there is at least a reasonable possibility that the life sentence would 
have been imposed if the case had been properly presented. See Chapman v. California, 
386 U.S. 18 (1967). It may mean an even greater likelihood of a life sentence if relief has 
been granted due to ineffective assistance of counsel or the failure to disclose evidence, 
or for some other harmful error in a federal habeas proceeding. See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); United States v. Bagley 473 U.S. 667 (1985); Brecht v. 
Abrahamson 507 U.S. 619 (1992). 
lOB See OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 2929.03(D)(2) (Anderson 1997). 
109While there was no appellate reversal in the Charles Marshall trial, some jurors 
spoke to the likelihood of a life sentence if the penalty trial had been properly conducted. 
See Ewinger, supra note 12. The jurors discussed life without parole and wondered why 
that option had not been provided, and two stated the option "could have swayed a few 
people" and "might have changed some people's opinions," as "we just wanted to make 
sure that he never got out of prison." Id. If this jury, which the defense asserted was 
exposed to highly prejudicial information in the trial phase, was wary of imposing death 
if LWOP were available as a punishment, what likelihood is there of a death sentence 
on a retrial before a new jury? Several Cuyahoga County juries have recently chosen 
life without parole over death, concluding this met society's need for punishment. See 
James Ewinger, Defendant Accepts Life Sentence, PLAIN DEALER, May 17, 1997, at 2-B, 
available in 1997 WL 6594533; James Ewinger, Restaurant Worker's Killer, 18 Sentenced to 
Life, No Parole, PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 19, 1996, at 7-B, available in 1996 WL 14688662. 
110See supra text accompanying note 98. 
111Under the prior law, inmates who received a reversal of the death sentence have 
refrained from raising possibly significant issues relating to their trials in the appeals 
processes, because of the assurance of a life sentence. These defendants saved the State 
of Ohio the time and expense of costly appeals and possible retrials by giving up their 
right to appeal trial phase issues. Under the previous resentencing law, if the defendant 
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d. Overall Cost Assessment 
Given the speculative benefits of re-seeking death, retrying the entire case 
will consume scarce resources that would be better spent on, among other 
things, reducing the burgeoning caseloads of Ohio trial courts. Because the 
eventual costs of re-seeking death will depend on how many jury retrials and 
penalty phase reversals occur, it is difficult to determine how much the 
enactment of Senate Bill258 will cost the Ohio citizenry.112 Of course, even one 
jury penalty retrial will represent a greater expenditure of resources than that 
imposed under the prior law, where all one had was a modest hearing to 
impose a life sentence. 
There is a further potential cost of Senate Bill 258: systemic integrity. The 
previous no-retrial-to-death practice serves justice as it likely yielded better 
tried cases the first time. Penalty phase errors are often preventable, and a 
no-retrial to death practice encourages their avoidance. To the extent the state 
seeks to avoid the risk of reversal and invests more resources and is more 
attentive to the reliable and fair conduct of the trial in the first instance, we all 
benefit. Senate Bill 258's message that retrials will be conducted may well 
encourage litigants and courts to be lax in trying cases. 
who won a penalty reversal gave up his attempts to overturn his conviction, he was 
assured a life sentence. State v. Penix,513 N.E.2d 744 (Ohio 1987). If, on the other hand, 
the defendant who won a penalty reversal continued his efforts to overturn his 
conviction and was successful at overturning it, death was a possible punishment when 
the entire case was re-tried. Former section 2929.06 of the Ohio Revised Code foreclosed 
a new death sentence when the penalty was reversed, but there was/ is no statutory bar 
to re-seeking death if the conviction is reversed. Id. Inmates who won a reversal of the 
death sentence gave up their appeals on trial phase issues to get a life sentence. See, e.g., 
State v. Denson, 531 N.E.2d 674 (Ohio 1988) (waiving appeal of trial phase issues). The 
old law thus saved resources. If prosecutors adopt a practice of re-seeking death through 
jury penalty retrials under Senate Bill258, these defense appeals on trial phase issues 
will surely be resumed, for there is no difference in the risk presented to the defendant 
in appealing or not-appealing. 
112While less than ten cases have been reversed in the courts thus far, the numbers of 
retrials may grow as Ohio cases move into the federal system, where statistics show 
relief has been ordered in as many as forty-one percent of capital cases. See Michael D. 
Hintze, Attacking the Death Penalty: Toward a Renewed Strategy Twenty Years After Furman, 
24 COLUM. HuM. Rrs. L. REv. 395, 410 (1993). There is also the possibility that Ohio 
appellate courts may reverse more cases if a resentencing process is available. The 
previous practice of foreclosing a death sentence may have dissuaded some justices from 
recognizing prejudicial error requiring reversal. Elected justices who see error may be 
unwilling to remedy it if it means taking the political heat of having foreclosed a death 
sentence. The current threats on the independence of the judiciary, and the apparent 
adverse impact reversing death sentences have sometimes had on judges' ability to 
retain their position, may well be undermining the very integrity of the rule of law. See 
Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between 
the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REv. 759 (1995). While 
this may be speculation, it does appear that reversal rates in other state courts with 
resentencing proceedings are higher, often ranging from twenty to thirty percent. See 
Mark Curriden, The Changing Faces of Southern Courts, 79 ABA J. 68, 70 Gune 1993). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Charles Marshall prosecution highlights a two-pronged legal dilemma. 
First, the case reminds us that litigants must diligently seek out the correct law 
in Ohio and be wary of relying on handbooks, or other condensed formulations 
of the law. Second, though the case fell short of testing the viability of Senate 
Bill258, Marshall forecasts the unfairness, unreliability, and waste of resources 
which will arise should Ohio prosecutors employ the new law and choose to 
re-seek death before a new sentencing jury. 
A cost-benefit analysis of Senate Bill 258 promises heavy losses when 
prosecutors re-seek death-and little, if any, benefit. By declining to use the 
jury penalty retrial practice now available in Ohio, a prosecutor avoids the 
costly expenditures of wasted time, court costs, prosecutorial and defense 
expenses, concerns about witness and evidence availability, and the complex 
problems of reliably recreating the trial phase of the proceeding.113 
Finally, the Marshall case demonstrates the illusory benefits of re-seeking 
death. For his other accompanying crimes, Charles Marshall has been 
sentenced to a total of 159 years.l14 Even if he had been re-sentenced to death, 
what will society have gained? According to the laws of nature, Mr. Marshall 
will die in prison. As the community is amply protected, deterrence achieved, 
and retribution satisfied by the sustained incarceration of a defendant, what 
compelling interest exists in making the defendant's death an unnatural one? 
Some may suggest that a retrial should go forth as a gesture of deference to the 
family.ns But ours is a system of justice that kills in the name of all Ohio citizens. 
The system is not designed to exact private vengeance; and the penalty phase 
113Prosecutors in other states have wisely refrained from pursuing death again 
following a penalty phase reversal in order to avoid a drain on limited trial and appellate 
resources, and because justice was amply served by a life sentence. See New Jersey v. 
Purnell, 708 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1998). Unbelievably, some states have conducted two and 
three penalty phases at an enormous cost to taxpayers. See State v. Sanderson, 488 S.E.2d 
133 (N.C. 1997) (employing three sentencing proceedings); McNair v. State, 706 So.2d 
828 (Ala. 1997) (employing two jury sentencing hearings and four judicial sentencing 
orders). 
114James Ewinger, New Jury Ordered to Decide Sentence, Pizzeria Murder Conviction 
Stands, PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 15, 1997, at 1-B, available in 1997 WL 6619045. 
llSJd. The Buccieri family has indicated it will attend the retrial for justice's sake. Id. 
Whether this means they favor, a death sentence, notwithstanding the 159 year prison 
term Mr. Marshall faces, is unclear. But it is likely the prosecutors have discussed this 
with them. See Andrew L. Sonner, Asking For the Death Penalty, CRIMINAL JusTICE, Fall 
1986, at 32,34-35 (asserting that almost all prosecutors consider the wishes of the victim 
or the victim's family when making critical decisions). 
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of a criminal trial is not a "substitute therapeutic environrnent."116 Tragically, 
vengeful decisions often work against healing.117 
116See Vivian Berger, Payne & Suffering-A Personal Reflection and a Victim-Centered 
Critique, 20 FLA. ST. L. REv. 21 (1992). The penalty phase process may well "disappoint 
the victim's family, by turning on them, ignoring them, or at best providing only partial 
relief." I d. "For reluctant participants in the penalty process, the need to dwell once more 
on their loss can only lead to renewed hurt and impede the healing process." Id. at 57. 
117Consider the words of the father of one victim of the Oklahoma City bombing: 
To me the death penalty is vengeance, and vengeance doesn't really 
help anyone in the healing process. Of course, our first reaction is to 
strike back. But if we permit ourselves to think through our feelings, 
we might get to a different place .... Since I've started expressing my 
views, I've been surprised by the number of people who tell me they 
feel the same way but were afraid to say anything for fear of offend-
ing those, like myself, who were most affected by the bombing .... 
[Killing the defendant] doesn't make any difference. The bottom line 
is that my little kid's not coming back. I'll have to deal with this till 
the day I die. Killing McVeigh will not change that[;] .... [D]ead men 
don't talk. If he is in prison long enough, he may tell us what his 
thought processes were, why he did what he did, and who else 
was involved. I want to hear that information. 
Bud Welch, A Father's Urge to Forgive, TIME, June 16, 1997, at 36, available in 1997 WL 
10902245. 
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